INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE TO AN EXPRESS
CONTRACT
It seems that the earliest discussion in the books in which

the question is discussed, whether the mental imbecility of a
party at the time of his performance of an act invalidates that
act, is to be found in Britton, ch. 28 f. 66. where the plea of insanity was held to be a good defense to an action on a bond.
Subsequently grave doubt arose as to the propriety of permitting
a man to disable and stultify himself, and it was held by Littleton
that the law did not permit a man to plead drunkenness as a defense to either a civil or criminal liability. This principle of law
as enunciated by Littleton and fully approved by his great scholastic commentator, Lord Coke, has the support of some few scattercd early English authorities, among which are 5 Edw. 11,
7o: 39 lien. VI, 42, and 35 Ap. Pl. lo. The doctrine as laid
down by Littleton and Coke, is based upon the absurd, irrational
and extraordinary reasoning. that if the party was non compos
,,cntis at the time of the performance of the act he afterwards
desired to invalidate, he could not have known that le executed
the act.' Notwithstanding the absurdity of the doctrine and the
reasoning and strong objections urged in opposition thereto by
Fitzherbert, it became so deeply rooted that for a time it prevailed as a maxim of the ancient common law.2 In Strond v.
Marshale' it was again held that insanity could not be pleaded
as a defense to an action on a bond and in this case the opinion
of Fitzherbert. given in N. B. 202. was expressly repudiated,
while in Beverly's Case4 it was even denied that in Fitzherbert's
time insanity had been allowed as a defense to an action on a
contract, and the maxim of the common law was said to be that
"a man shall not diable himself." The adoption of this maxim.
if "maxim' it can be called. in the Beverly case was not approved
in subsequent cases.
a4 Co. Litt. 172.
'Jenk. Cent. 4o.
'Cr. Eliz. 39.
'Printed in Thomas's & Francis's ed. 2 Reports, 658.
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Thompson v. Leach ' decided that an act of atn insane person was void for the perplexing reason that it is not for want
of right that an insane person cannot avoid his own feofflment,
but by reason of his personal incapacity.
In Yates v. Boen G after reviewing the opinion of Baron
Pengelley in Smith v. Carr, decided in 1728, it was held that
insanity may be shown in evidence under the plea of non est
factum.1 Notwithstanding. Lord Coke in approving the doctrine as enuncialed by Littlcton," places the drunkard in his
fourth classification of insane persons. saying his drunkenness
shall give no benefit to him or his heirs. The more modern
English authorities entertain a more charitable view of the
drunkard, and classifying him as one qui yaudet lucidis. intervu:Ili.. hold that contplete intoxication is a gooxI defense to an
action on a bond anl may be given in evidence on the plea of
io1 est facltun. Lord Ellenborough said, in Pitt v. Smith:'
"Intoxication is gxhll evidence under the plea of not! esi
faclum, to a deed; non concessif to a grant, and non assumpsit
to a promise:'
The maxim of Littleton and Coke has been utterly exploded, and the English law on the subject is now settled in
accordance with the rule laid down by Britton, which appears to
have been approved and adopted in most civilized countries; to
and this rule is certainly in accord with reason, humanity and
natural justice. even though it was necessary for the courts to
distinguish au\ ay the maxim of Coke and Littleton.
Lord Coke says the right of a defendant to plead intoxication in avoidance of his contract was never recognized at
common law, and that although lie who is drunk for the time
being is non conipos inenti. yet his drunkenness shall not ex*i Lord Raymond. 313.
"2 Stra. 1104.
Bullers N. P. 1;2; Fenton r. Holloway. i Stark. X. P. C. t6;
Smith. 3 Camp. 33'Coke on Littleton, 247. . . 2.
3 Camp. 33- i Evans, Pothier, 29.
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tenuate his act, nor be turned to his avail."1
in stating the rules, said:

Pothier, however,

"'It is evident that drunkenness, when it g6es so far as evidently dcstroying the reahon, renders a person in that state, so
long as it continues, incapable of contracting." 2
The trend of modern authority follows the rule of Pothier
and sustains the right of a person to plead his own drunkenness
in avoidance of his contract, where the intoxication is of such a
degree as to incapacitate him from comprehending the nature of
his transaction. s
Lord Coke, although admitting that a person in a complete
state of intoxication is for the time insane, denies that drunkenness can be set up in avoidance of a contract under any circunmstances; andfhe makes no distinction between civil and criminal
cases, refusing to qualify his doctrine even where the intoxication was procured by the connivance of another who could be
or has been benefited thereby, lie lays down the broad principle that drunkenness cannot be pleaded as an excuse for the
commission of a crime or in avoidance of a civil obligation. Sir
William Blackstone considers the rule of Coke and Littleton to
be based upon false reasoning 4 In Yates v. Boen,15 the defendant sought to give evidence of intoxication. The Chief Justice
hesitated before admitting - the evidence" upon the authority
enunciated in Beverley's case, that a man shall not in law be
allowed to stultify himself, but under the doctrine of Thompson
v. Leach,16 where it was held that the deed of a man non conttpos
menitis was void for want of capacity to bind himself or his
property, admitted the evidence. And Lord Mansfield so ruled
"Coke Lit. 124a.
"Pothier's Obligation on Contracts, vol i, p. 49.
"Eskine Inst. 8j4. e. seq.; Fonblanque Eq. 67; Harman r. Johnston, I
McArthur. 139: Clifton v. Davis. i Pars. S. Eq. Cas. 31; Wade v. Colbert,
12 Am. Dec. 632: Bt'roughs v. Richman, 13 X. J. L 233, 23 Am. Dec. 717;
Bursinger v. Bank. 67 Wis. 75. 58 Am. Rep. 848; Reynolds v. Walker, i Wash.
(Va.) 164: Bush v. Brenig. 113 Pa. 310.57 Am. Rep. 469; Buxton v. Buxton,
2 Aik. (Vt.) 167. z6 Am. Dec. 69t: Fowler v. Meadow Brook Water Co.,
208 Pa. 473. _7 Atd. 9_9; Ewell's Ld. Cas. 72&
"2 Black. Com. 291.
U2
23

Stra. 1104.
31ad. 391.
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in the case of Chamberlain of London v. Evans, mentioned in
the appendix to Blackstone's Commentaries. 7 The case of
Thompson v. Leach has not only the approval of Mr. Justice
Blackstone and Lord Mansfield. but also the sanction of Chitty,
Selwyn, Phillips and the most approved elementary English
writers and commentators. With one or two exceptions B'verley's
Case has never been recognized as law by any of the courts of
the United States; and in this country it has been almost unifornily held that a party who enters into a contract when in a
complete state of intoxication nmy plead his drunkenness to avoid
s
the performance of the obligation.'
The great weight of modern authority both American and
English adhers to the principle without qualification, that intoxication is a defense to a civil contractual obligation regardless
of the fact that the intoxication was procured by the party claiming the benefit of the agreement. In Gore v. Gibson 1; it was
held that in an action by an endorsee against an endorser of a bill
of exchange the defense, that there was sucl a degree of intoxication at the time of the endorsement as to deprive the endorser
of his understanding. reason and ability to comprehend the nature
of his endorsement, was a good answer to the action and that
this was not merely an argumentative traverse of the endorsement. The line of reasoning has the approval of Chancellor
20
Kent and many other eminent American authorities.
Intoxication does not render a contract void but voidable.21
It is true that in Gore v. Gibson 22 the judges used the word
"void," but from the reasoning in that case it may well be inferred
that a contract nade with a drunkard is merely voidable, and that
"Letters of Mr. Justice Blackstone, Philadelphia,

Ch. Rep. 364.

73. p. 149; 4 Desaus.

"Rice v. Peel, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) So3; Arnold v. Hickman, 6 Munf.

(Va.) i5.
29

13 Mees. & W\.623.

2 Kent Com. (13th ed.) 451; Reynolds v. Walker. z Wash. (Va.) 164;

Curties v. Hall, i Southar& (N. J.), 361; State Bank v. McCoy, 69 Pa.
204; Duncan Y. McCullan, 4 S. & R. (Pa.)

484; Clark v. Cardwell, 6 Watts
(Pa.), i39; Wigglesworth v. Steers, I H. & M. (Ira.) 7o; Freeman v. Staats,
8 N. J. Eq. 814.
" Story on Contracts. 987; Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill.
io8; 'Matthews v. Baxter,
L R. 8 Ex. isa.
= 13 Mees & U. 623.
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the judges meant merely that a drunken man's contract, if not
ratified by him when soler, could not be enforced against him.
In Jlatthci'sv. Baxter 23 Pigott and Pollock, Barons, commenting on Gore v. Gibson, expressed the opinion that the contract of
a drunken man was voidable and not void; and this represents
the trend of modern authority.2 4 It may be fairly deduced from
some of the English cases that a distinction is drawn between the
effect of a complete state of intoxication which deprives a man
of his reason, and a state of drunkenness which merely prevents
him from fonning a rational judgment, holding-that in the former
the contract is void ab initio and in the latter voidable merely.25
In Wf ilson v. Bigger : it was held that a party reduced to such extreme debility by intoxication as to be unable to sit up unsupported, or to hold his pen and make his mark unless the pen is
held for him, can no more execute a contract of conveyance than
if he were completely drunk.
The ancient common law rule repudiated by Coke and Littleton appears to have the support of at least one American
authority. Drummond v. Hopper2 7 held that a contract made
with a man in a state of complete intoxication was absolutely
void, and this opinion is based upon the anomalous dictum of
Lord Coke, who declared that,
"Although, he who is drunk, is for the time, non conzpos
mnentis, yet his drunkenness does not extenuate his act or
offence, nor turn to his avail; but it is a great offence in itself,
and therefore aggravates his offence, and doth not derogate
from the act which he did during that time, and that as well
in cases touching his life, his lands, his g6ods. or any other
thing that concerns him."
In another case. Hawkins v. Cannwn,2 the court stated that
a contract made by a drunken man was void: but the actual deL R. 8 Ex. i3z, 42 L J. Ex. 73.
"Bush v. Brenig. 113 Pa. 3zo. 6 Atl. 86; Carpenter v.Rodgers, 61 Mich.
384. 1 Am. St. Rep. s95; .Matthews v. Baxter, L R. 8 Lx. 132.,
42 L J.
Ex. -3; Chitty on Cont. (xith Am. ed.) 192: Wald's Pollock on Cont.92.
'Cooke r. Clayworth, 18 Ves. xz; Wald's Pollock on Cont. 9r, and cases
cited.
wAV. & S. (Pa.) 1i'.
4 Hart. (DeL) 327%
4 Rich. L (S. Car.) 136.
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cision was that a contract made under such conditions was capable of ratification b- the party when he came to his sober senses.
The rule of the civil law is stated by Pothier as follows:
"Itis evident that drunkenness, when it goes so far as to
absolutely dethrone the reason, renders a person in this state,
so long as it continues, incapable of contracting, since it renders
him incapable of consent"
This is mine consistent with reason and justice than the
maxim laid down by Lord Coke who terms a drunkard
deanzon voluntarius. and one who by his own act for a time deprives himself of memory and understanding. 2 Sir W\illiam
Blackstone and Fitzherbert did not scruple to reject the maxim
of Littleton and Coke although it met with the approval of the
judges during the reign of Henry VI, wherein it was decided
that a party was not permitted to disable himself by pleading
incapacity and an heir was barred of his right of entry by the
feoffment of his insane ancestor. This theory of Lord Coke is
based on two conflicting reasons, and places its author in the
paradox and anomaly of occupying two synchronous and antagonistic positions, and is unlike every other part of our great system
of jurisprudence which is reducible to consistent and immutable
principles of reason and natural justice. Later opinions recognizing the fallacy and the inconvenience of the rule in Beverley's
Case have totally disregarded that isolated and anomalous
maxim; and although the intoxication may have been effected
by the voluntary act of the party pleading it as a defense to the
contractual obligation, modern courts exercise jurisdiction for the
protection of the drunkard.30 A very able English authority
declared:
"It never can be said that a person absolutely drunk has
that freedom of mind generally esteemed necessary to a deliberate consent to a contract. The reasoning faculty is for a
time deposed. At law it has been held upon a plea of non
est factumt, the defendant may give evidence that they made
him sign the bond when he was so drunk that he did not know
what he did. So a will made by a drunken man is invalid.
'Beverley's Case. 4 Coke 124.
1 Waldron v. Angleman, 7x N. J.L

66, 58 At. Rep. _68.
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And will a court of equity be less indulgent to human frailty?
It seems to be a fraud to make a contract 3with a man who is so
drunk as to be incapable of deliberation." 1

According to the weight of authority, the maker of a note,
as between himself and the payee, may plead intoxication in
avoidance of payment if he can show such a degree of intoxication at the time of the execution, which would have drowned
reason, memory and judgnent and the impairment of his mental
faculties to the extent of rendering him non compos nzentis,
although there is no evidence that any person connected with the
transaction aided or procured his intoxication. This defense may
also be set up against those taking the note with full knowledge of the circumstances; but on the ground of public policy
and the necessities of trade the defense of intoxication is not
32
available against an innocent holder for value.
The rule is well stated by Air. Justice Williams in State
Bank v. McCoy: 33
"The note of an insane person or of one perfectly imbecile, which he has been influenced to sign by fraud or imposition, is void in the hands of an innocent holder for value, without notice of the makers condition when it was given. There is
a difference between the cases. Insanity or total imbecility is
a pernianent state or condition of the mind, disabling one from
taking care of himself. Drunkenness is a temporary disability
.
If a man voluntarily deprived
voluntarily produced.
himself of the use of his reason by strong drink, why should
he not be responsible to an innocent party for the acts he*performed while in that condition? It seems to be he ought on
the principle that where a loss must be borne by one of two
innocent persons, it shall be borne by him who occasioned it.
But there is another and controlling reason for holding the
maker liable to the endorsee in such cases, founded on principles of public policy and the necessities of commerce."
If a party having the intent of avoiding the contract voluntarily procures his intoxication for the purpose of entering into
i Maddock's Ch. Pr. 233; Story's Eq. Jur., §23r.
t'State Bank i*. McCoy. 69 Pa. 2o4; Gore v. Gibson, 13 M. & AV. 623;
•Molton v. Camroy. 2 Exch. 487; Wigglesworth v. Steers, i H. & . (Va.)
7o; I DanL Neg. Inst.. §214; Birdson v. Birdson, 2 Head (Tenn.), 287-

"69 Pa. 2o6
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it, the fraudulent inttent precedes his intoxication and renders him
iicnlletent to plead his condition as a defenSe.34
Although the authorities seldom discuss the degree of intoxication whicl is necessarv to avoid a contract, ne'vertheless
there is some variance in the decisions. Pothier " holds that a
degree of drunkenness sufficient to take away reason renders
the person in that condition incapable to contract, since he is
unable to assent Hiarmon v.Johnson,-- held: there was no error
in the following instruction:
"'It is not necessary, in order to render the deed of the
def vidant invalid, that at the time of the execution and acknowlcdgement lie was entirely demented by drink, but his act will
be rendered void if he was in such a condition of mind that
lie could ilot comprehend what were the terms and conditions
of the instrument."
Upon appeal this case was decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, "7 where Mr. Justice Bradley, approving the
principle laid down by Pothier said:
'Bothi minds must meet in such transaction, and if one is so
weak, unsound and diseased that the party is incapable of under:tading the nature and quality of the act to be perfonned,
or its consequences, he is incapable to assent to the terms and
conditions of the instrument, whether that state of his mind
was produced by mental or physical disease, and whether it
resulted from ordinary sickness, or fron accident, or from
debauchery, or from habitual and protracted intemperance."'1
In some of the cases above cited the governing principle
is pronounced. that lie who seeks relief on the ground of intoxication must in some manner show that lie has repudiated his
agreement made -while in a state of intoxication; and if the position of the parties has been so altered since the making of the
"I DanL Neg. Inst., 125.
" Vol i, c. 1, a4, §I.
3 1MacArth. (D. C.) 139.
S94 U. S. 371.
'Clifton v.Davis. T Pars. Eq. 31: Johnson v. Medlicott, 3 P. Win. 131;
Cory v.Cory. i Ves. i9; Shaw v. Thackray. t Sm. & Giff. 537; Warbison
V. Lemmln. 3 BlackL 51: Crane v.Conklin. Saxt. 346; .Maxwell v. Pittenger,
2 Green Ch. 156.
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contract that the other party would be prejudiced by a rescission. then he who seeks rescission must attempt to restore the
.talus in quo, unless the intoxication was procured by the contrivance of the other party. And this principle of law seems
sound and consistent with reason. 3 '
In law the contract of an intoxicated person is voidable for
lack of capacity to assent, and equity assumes jurisdiction in such
cases on the ground of fraud or imposition. Equity will avoid
a contract where the intoxication has been procured by the connivance of the other party to the contract, or where the drunken
party has been taken advantage of or imposed upon by the other
party. If neither fraud nor imposition can be shown and the
intoxication was voluntary. equity will not afford relief merely
on the ground of intoxication, but leaves the party to his defense
4
at law. '
The New Jersey rule appears to be, that in order to avoid a
contract in equity for reason of intoxication it must be clearly
demonstrated either that the drunkenness was procured by the
connivance of the other party who received the benefit of the
contract, or that an undue advantage was taken of the
situation."'
The rule promulgated by Sir Joseph Jekyl and approved by
that very learned American author, Mr. Pomeroy, that equity
has jurisdiction to relieve and especially, if the intoxication was
occasioned by the contrivance or fraud of the other party and
is made so excessive as to deprive the party asking for relief of
his reason and understanding, is based upon the principle that
a person cannot seriously and deliberately consent while in such
'Carpenter v. Rodgers, 61 Mich. 384, 28 .N. IV. 16.
' Bowen v. Clark. 37 Fed. Cas. No. i. 721; Butler v. Mulvihill, 4 Eng
Reprint. 49; Say v. Barwick, t Ves. & B. i95; Cooke v. Clayworth, 18 Ves.
12: Osmond v. Fitzroy. 3 P. Wn. i39: Reynolds v. Walker, i Wash.
(Va.) 164; Willshire v. Marshall, T4 L T. RI. N. S. 396; Rodman v. Zilley.
i X. J. Eq. 32o: Reinicker v. Smith. 2 H. & J. (Md.) 42t; -Story's Eq. Jr.,
§231: 2 Kent Com. 42; O'Conner v. RAmpt. 29 X. J. Eq. z36; 14 Cyc. ino6;
2 Por. Eq. Jut.. §494.
'Crane v. Conklin. t N. J. Eq. 346; Rodman v. Zilley, Id. 32o; Pittenger vs. Pittenger. 3 X. J. Eq. 357: Warrack v. Campbell 25 N. J. Eq. 485.
Xone of these cases show that a complete case of intoxication was proved.
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a state, and without this ability to reason and consent no contract entered into !,\- a person should be enforceable against lim. 42
The ohl authorities which were based upon the dictum of Lord
Coke and supported by some loose decisions in the Year Books

during the reigns of Edward III and Henry VI and a few other
scattering authorities, have now been entirely abolished: and the
rule now is. that an intoxication which is absolute and used by

the other party to the contract to his advantage. is sufficient
foundation for equitable relief. 43 And. a fortiori, even though
the intoxication is only partial, if produced by the connivance
of the other party who made use of the opportunity by imposition or unfainess, equity will grant appropriate affirmative relief . 1 The case of Pittenge'r v. Pittenger43 contains a dictum
which ma- be fairl- construed as in conflict with the above stated
plinciple. However. it must be remembered that courts of equity
are ver" cautious in affording relief on the ground of intoxication and the remedy is seldom given unless coupled with the
drunkemess there is also shown a conduct plainly inequitable
practiced by the other party.
Mr. Justice Story said:
"Courts of equity. as a matter of public policy, do not
incline, on the one hand, to lend their assistance to a person
who has obtained an agreement or a deed from another in a
state of intoxication; and, on the other hand. they are equally
unwilling to assist the intoxicated party to gdct rid of his agreement or deed merely on the ground of intoxication at the time
of :he execution. They leave the parties to their ordinary
remedies at law. unless there is some fraudulent contrivance
or some imposition. It is upon this special ground that courts
of equity have acted in cases where a broader principle has
sometines supposed to have been held." 4T
'Spier v. Higgins. decided at the rolls. 1814. 1 Mad. Ci. 304 -2 Por.
Eq. Jur. 949'Cook v. Ca2-ton. ig8 Ves. i2: Schackleton r. Stbree, 86 Ill 6t6; Prentice v. Achorn. 2 Paige (.. Y.), 30; 2 Pora. Eq. Jur.. §%99.
"OConnor r. Rempt. 29 N. J. Eq. 136.

"3N. J. Bq. M8

"Schram r. OConnor. 98 Ill. 39; Harbison v. Lemon. z3 Am. Dec. 3-6;
Selah v- Selal, 2-3 N. J. Eq. 185Storys Eq. Jar. .231-232.
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Gathered from the authorities above mentioned the modern
rule governing the question of intoxication as a defense to an
express contract, may be summarized as follows:
If at the time of making the contract, the party seeking to
avoi(l it was in such a state of intoxication that he was incapable
of assenting to the agreement and has not ratified the transaction in his sober senses, the obligation is voidable, especially if
any advantage has been taken of the intoxicated person and
fraud or imposition has been practiced by the other party to the
contract. A contract which may be invalidated by reason of
intoxication can be ratified by the intoxicated party when sober
and will thereafter be binding. Intoxication of the maker of a
negotiable note may invalidate it as against a bona fide holder
with knowledge of the circumnstances, but is not available as a
defense against a bona fidc endorsee for value, without notice
of the circumstances of the transaction. A drunkard may be held
liable upon implied contracts for his actual necessities. If the
intoxication was procured by the contrivance of the other party,
or if either fraud or imposition has been practiced by or through
the party benefited, the intoxicated party may institute a suit
in equity for the cancellation or rescission of the obligation; but
before a court of equity will grant the relief the party seeking
this aid must return the consideration he has received. Intoxication may be pleaded by the intoxicated party, his personal representative or heirs, but cannot be pleaded by a third person.
Sidney J. Dudley.
Hanipton, Va.

